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For pandemic inﬂ  uenza planning, realistic estimates of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) and antiviral medica-
tion required for hospital healthcare workers (HCWs) are 
vital. In this simulation study, a patient with suspected avian 
or pandemic inﬂ  uenza (API) sought treatment at 9 Austra-
lian hospital emergency departments  where patient–staff 
interactions during the ﬁ  rst 6 hours of hospitalization were 
observed. Based on World Health Organization deﬁ  nitions 
and guidelines, the mean number of “close contacts” of the 
API patient was 12.3 (range 6–17; 85% HCWs); mean “ex-
posures” were 19.3 (range 15–26). Overall, 20–25 PPE sets 
were required per patient, with variable HCW compliance 
for wearing these items (93% N95 masks, 77% gowns, 83% 
gloves, and 73% eye protection). Up to 41% of HCW close 
contacts would have qualiﬁ   ed for postexposure antiviral 
prophylaxis. These data indicate that many current national 
stockpiles of PPE and antiviral medication are likely inad-
equate for a pandemic.
A
lthough a new inﬂ  uenza pandemic may appear inevi-
table, critical parameters of transmissibility and at-
tack rate are uncertain. Estimates based on extrapolations 
from the 3 inﬂ  uenza pandemics of the 20th century suggest 
that healthcare facilities in the United States alone may be 
required to cope with 314,000–734,000 additional hospi-
talizations and 18–42 million outpatient visits (1). During 
the early containment phase of a pandemic, patients with 
suspected infection are likely to be referred to hospitals for 
isolation, diagnosis, and treatment until the transmissibility 
and virulence of the pandemic strain are known. Although 
social distancing and school closures may reduce risk in the 
wider community (2), healthcare workers (HCWs) are like-
ly to encounter repeated close exposures. If hospitals are to 
continue to function adequately, reliable access to effective 
personal protective equipment (PPE; gowns, N95 masks, 
gloves, and eye protection) and antiviral drug therapy will 
be necessary for an unpredictable period. With awareness 
of the recent severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
outbreak and with growing concern about human deaths 
from avian inﬂ   uenza (H5N1), governments worldwide 
have begun to stockpile PPE and antiviral medication.
Key strategies to control the speed and extent of viral 
spread within healthcare settings have been advocated by 
national government guidelines (3–6) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) (7). These include rigorous infection 
control practices, prescriptive instructions for the use of 
PPE, and dissemination of antiviral medication. However, 
information regarding the required quantity and rate of use 
of these valuable resources in an outbreak situation is lack-
ing, thereby limiting valid assessments of the adequacy 
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of current stockpiles. This study aimed to estimate the re-
source needs that a hospital might face in the ﬁ  rst few hours 
of management of a single patient who sought treatment 
with possible avian or pandemic inﬂ  uenza (API) or similar 
highly virulent respiratory infection.
Methods
In a prospective, multicenter, simulation exercise, we 
assessed the initial 6 hours of management of a patient (ac-
tor) who appeared for treatment at a hospital emergency de-
partment with a history consistent with API. Tertiary-level 
university teaching hospitals across eastern Australia were 
invited to participate. The inclusion criteria were willing-
ness to join the simulation and possession of a formal local 
infection control protocol for the management of API that 
followed Australian (3) or WHO guidelines (7). The study 
was approved as a quality assurance project by the ethics 
committee at each participating site.
Conduction of Simulation
For each of the participating hospitals, the 6-hour sim-
ulation was conducted midweek, beginning between 8:30 
and 9:30 AM, to avoid the busiest emergency department 
periods and to minimize the possibility that the care of ac-
tual patients might be compromised. The simulated patient 
was an actor unknown to the hospital staff, who appeared at 
the triage area of the emergency department and followed 
a prerehearsed script designed to trigger the hospital pro-
tocol for API. The standardized history included a 72-hour 
period of high fever, cough, shortness of breath, and severe 
malaise after a recent return from a Southeast Asian coun-
try. The patient reported handling unwell live poultry in a 
rural setting where human cases of avian inﬂ  uenza were 
known to have occurred. This standarized clinical scenario 
was chosen because guidelines for managing human cases 
of avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) form the current template for 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza case management (4,5,7). To heighten 
staff awareness of the appropriate management of an API 
case, each hospital organized education sessions on PPE 
use, infection control practices, and protocol familiariza-
tion in the 1–2 weeks before the simulation. Staff members 
were informed that the simulation would occur at some 
time during the allocated week (but not the exact day) and 
were instructed that hospital protocol should be followed as 
if it were an actual API case.
Each site had at least 3 trained infection control ob-
servers available who were familiar with using a modiﬁ  ed 
version of a validated hand hygiene assessment data input 
tool (8) to accurately record potential API exposures in a 
standard manner. The observers were provided by the coor-
dinating center or by the participating hospital. A principal 
investigator (A.S.) was present at each simulation to ensure 
standardization. The following 3 procedures were observed 
and assessed (Figure): 1) patient management through tri-
age, emergency, radiology, and inpatient ward (including 
transfer between areas); 2) respiratory specimen collection, 
transport, and processing; and 3) cleaning of clinical areas 
after the suspected API patient had left the area or the simu-
lation had been completed.
Detailed observations were collated on infection con-
trol practice, clinical resources used, sequence of donning 
and removing PPE, time spent by the patient in each clini-
cal area, and close contacts and exposures generated. The 
observation period could be stopped at any time if an actual 
patient’s care was judged to be compromised by continua-
tion of the simulation.
At the time of collecting blood, respiratory specimens, 
or chest radiographs, surrogate specimens (venipuncture 
tube containing water, water-moistened swabs, and archival 
chest x-ray, respectively) were substituted by the accom-
panying study observer. Surrogate blood and respiratory 
specimens were followed to the laboratory, where infection 
control practices were observed until specimens were sent 
to the reference laboratory for molecular testing.
Study Deﬁ  nitions
A HCW was deﬁ  ned as any person working within 
the healthcare facility. We used the WHO deﬁ  nition of a 
“close contact” as any person (including non-HCWs) com-
ing within 1 m of an API patient within or outside of an iso-
lation room or area (7). Close contacts were counted only 
once. An “exposure” was counted each time a close contact 
came within 1 m of the API patient. A “PPE item” included 
a disposable gown, pair of gloves, pair of protective eye-
wear, or N95 mask (or equivalent particulate respirator). A 
“PPE set” was deﬁ  ned as the appropriate combination of 
1542  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 10, October 2007
Figure. Study algorithm. Observer 1 follows the patient through all 
clinical areas, including transit between areas. Observer 2 monitors 
cleaning of clinical areas after use. Observer 3 monitors transport 
of clinical specimen to the pathology department and subsequent 
specimen processing.Personal Protective Equipment and Suspected Avian Inﬂ  uenza
PPE items recommended for HCW use in a particular clini-
cal setting (7) (Table 1). “Opportunity for PPE item use” 
was deﬁ  ned as any instance of actual use of a PPE item 
during the study as well as any instance where the wear-
ing of a PPE item was recommended by WHO guidelines 
(7), as objectively noted by accompanying study observ-
ers (Table 1). These items included PPE worn by HCWs 
involved in direct patient care (HCW close contacts) and 
ancillary HCWs who performed indirect clinical tasks as-
sociated with the API case-patient such as cleaning, ward 
support, and specimen transportation and processing. Envi-
ronmental decontamination of clinical areas after use was 
considered adequate if cleaning and disinfection procedures 
were undertaken in a manner consistent with WHO recom-
mendations (7). The time spent in each clinical area was 
recorded from when the API patient ﬁ  rst entered an area to 
the time when the patient entered the next area.
For the purpose of identifying HCW close contacts who 
would be offered postexposure antiviral prophylaxis, HCW 
close contacts were stratiﬁ  ed into either moderate- or low-
risk groups derived from WHO criteria (9). High-risk close 
contacts, deﬁ  ned as “household or close family contacts of 
a strongly suspected or conﬁ  rmed avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
patient” were not relevant to our study. The moderate-risk 
group included HCW close contacts wearing an insufﬁ  cient 
or inappropriate PPE set during any of their exposures. The 
low-risk group included HCW close contacts wearing an 
appropriate PPE set for all exposures (9). 
Outcome Measures
The study outcome measures were the following: 1) 
number of close contacts associated with the API patient 
during the initial 6 hours of patient management, includ-
ing how many of these were HCW close contacts; 2) the 
total number of exposures experienced by close contacts; 
3) overall quantity and type of PPE items (gowns, gloves, 
N95 masks, eyewear) actually used during the simulation 
by HCW close contacts and ancillary HCWs; 4) overall 
“opportunities for PPE item use” for HCW close contacts 
and ancillary HCWs (i.e., actual use plus missed opportuni-
ties for appropriate PPE use); and 5) stratiﬁ  cation of HCW 
close contacts into medium- or low-risk groups for the pur-
pose of recommending antiviral postexposure prophylaxis.
Results
Nine tertiary-level university teaching hospitals in 
3 states of eastern Australia participated in the study 
(Table 2). The simulations occurred in the winter season, 
from May through August 2006. All sites conducted tar-
geted staff education sessions 1–2 weeks before their exer-
cise. Seven of the 9 simulations proceeded for the planned 
6 hours of observation, and 2 were curtailed because of a 
critical need for the emergency department bed. Had these 
latter 2 sites continued, the patient would almost certainly 
have spent the entire study period isolated in the emergency 
department, as suitable ward beds were not available. The 
time spent in each clinical area for each site is summarized 
in Table 2. All sites performed radiography within the 
emergency department.
The number of close contacts and total exposures to 
the potential API patient are summarized in Table 3. The 
highest number occurred in the ﬁ  rst hour of hospital care 
(triage and emergency department), which correlated with 
the initial intensive clinical and radiologic assessment and 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 10, October 2007  1543 
Table 1. WHO Recommendations for HCW barrier precautions, dependent on type of exposure*† 
HCW activity  Recommended PPE set 
Close contact (<1 m) with potential API-infected patient 
within or outside of the isolation room or area 
Gloves, gown, N95 mask (or equivalent particulate respirator), eye 
protection
Cleaning Gloves, either gown or apron 
Patient transport within healthcare facilities  Gown, gloves 
Specimen transport and processing  Not defined except to use “safe handling practices”; interpreted as use of 
gloves (minimum) and gown if opening specimen bag. 
*WHO, World Health Organization; HCW, healthcare worker; PPE, personal protective equipment; API, avian or pandemic influenza. 
†Derived from (7). 
Table 2. Participating institutions and time patient spent in each area* 
Hospital
Characteristic A BCD E FGHI
State VIC VIC VIC VIC VIC TAS VIC VIC NSW
Urban/regional Urban Urban Urban Urban Regional Urban Urban Urban Urban
Inpatient beds, no.  840 320 750 450 400 490 400 400 880
Annual admissions  67,700 40,000 79,500 47,200 61,200 52,300 45,300 93,100 71,600
Total simulation time, h  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2.5 2.5
Triage time, h  0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
ED time, h†  2 2.9 3 1.9 2.2 1.5 2.4 2.3‡ 2.4‡
Ward time, h  3.7 2.8 3 3.9 3.7 4.4 3.5 – –
*VIC, Victoria; TAS, Tasmania; NSW, New South Wales; ED, emergency department.  
†Includes time spent in ED radiology unit. 
‡Simulation of avian or pandemic influenza ended prematurely because beds were needed. RESEARCH
specimen collection. Patient transfer between areas was an-
other peak time for exposures. The average number of close 
contacts for each API patient during the study period was 
12.3 (median 11, range 6–17), with 19.3 exposures (median 
20, range 15–26). HCW close contacts constituted 85% of 
all close contacts; the remainder were patients or visitors 
who were generally exposed in the triage area.
All 9 sites processed the respiratory specimen, with an 
average of 2.9 HCWs (median 3, range 2–6) handling or 
transporting the specimen, predominantly in the pathology 
department. Two sites used a vacuum transport system to 
deliver specimens from the emergency department to the 
laboratory, contrary to WHO recommendations (7).
Environmental decontamination of clinical areas af-
ter departure of the suspected API patient was performed 
haphazardly at all sites. The triage area was appropriately 
cleaned in none of the 9 sites, whereas the emergency de-
partment and ward areas at sites that completed the full 
simulation were cleaned appropriately in 6 of 7, and 4 of 
7 instances, respectively; 1–2 cleaners were required per 
clinical area to appropriately perform this task.
Large quantities of N95 masks, disposable gowns, 
gloves, and eye protection were used and indicated during 
the study period (Table 4). Adherence to appropriate use 
by HCWs (HCW close contacts and ancillary HCWs) was 
variable and depended on the particular PPE item, clinical 
area, and participating institution. Appropriate use of N95 
masks by HCWs occurred in 93% of exposures (actual use/
total opportunities for PPE use, 18/19.4), although the cor-
responding ﬁ  gures for disposable gowns, gloves, and eye 
protection were lower (77%, 83%, and 73%, respectively).
HCW close contacts were stratiﬁ  ed into either moder-
ate- or low-risk groups, depending on whether an appro-
priate PPE set was worn during every exposure. The pro-
portions of HCW close contacts who appropriately wore a 
PPE set, rather than an N95 mask alone, for every expo-
sure were 59% and 92%, respectively. Thus, depending on 
how rigorously WHO antiviral medication guidelines (9) 
were followed, from 8% to 41% of all HCW close contacts 
would be classiﬁ  ed as having experienced a medium-risk 
exposure and therefore would potentially require postexpo-
sure antiviral prophylaxis. This amounts to an average of 
0.8 to 4.3 courses of antiviral medication per suspected API 
patient during the initial 6 hours of management.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁ  rst multicenter study to 
estimate the quantity of PPE and antiviral therapy that may 
be required to manage patients with suspected API admit-
ted to hospitals. During the initial 6 hours of hospital as-
sessment, the number of close contacts of a single suspect-
ed API patient was high (mean 12.3), with a mean number 
of exposures of 19.3. Not surprisingly, most (85%) close 
contacts were HCWs, and PPE use was at its most intense 
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Table 3. Number of close contacts (CCs) and exposures to API patient* 
No. CCs (no. exposures) per hospital 
Characteristic A B C D E F G H I Mean
Total 17 (26)  15 (20)  6 (15)  11 (20)  14 (17) 12 (20)  11 (17) 10 (11)† 6 (8)†   12.3 (19.3)‡
By clinical area
  Triage  8 (8) 4 (4) 1 (1) 2 (2) 5 (5) 1 (1) 3 (3) 7 (7) 3 (3) 3.8 (3.8) 
  ED 5 (11) 7 (11) 3 (9) 7 (10) 6 (9) 7 (10) 6 (9) 3 (4)† 3 (5)† 5.9 (9.9)‡
  Ward  4 (7) 4 (5) 2 (5) 2 (8) 3 (3) 4 (9) 2 (5) – – 3.0 (6.0)
By study period, h
  0–1 10 (12) 8 (8) 3 (4) 6 (8) 7 (7) 8 (8) 5 (5) 9 (10) 5 (6) 6.8 (7.6)
  1–2 2 (3) 0 (1) 1 (2) 2 (2) 3 (5) 2 (6) 3 (3) 0 (0) 1 (2) 1.6 (2.7)
  2–3 2 (4) 0 (2) 0 (4) 3 (5) 2 (3) 1 (3) 0 (2) 1 (1)† 0 (0)† 1.1 (3.3)‡
  3–4 3 (5) 5 (6) 2 (3) 0 (2) 0 (0) 1 (1) 2 (3) – – 1.9 (2.9)
  4–5 0 (1) 2 (2) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (1) 0 (2) 1 (2) – – 0.6 (1.4)
  5–6  0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (2) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (2) – – 0.1 (1.0)
By HCW status
  Non-HCW 3 (3) 5 (5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (3) 0 (0) 2 (2) 4 (4)† 0 (0)† 1.9 (1.9)‡
  HCW  14 (23) 10 (15) 6 (15) 11 (20) 11 (14) 12 (20) 9 (15) 6 (7)† 6 (8)† 10.4 (17.4)‡
No. HCW CCs (%) 
who wore complete 
PPE set during each 
exposure§ 
2 359888 2 † 3 † 6 . 1  ( 5 9 ) ‡
No. HCW CCs (%) 
who wore N95 masks 
during each 
exposure§ 
12 7 6 10 11 12 9 5† 3† 9.6 (92)‡
*API, avian (H5N1) or pandemic influenza; ED, emergency department; HCW, healthcare worker; PPE, personal protective equipment.
†Incomplete data as simulation terminated after 2.5 h. 
‡Excludes data from sites H and I. 
§World Health Organization recommendations (Table 1).Personal Protective Equipment and Suspected Avian Inﬂ  uenza
in the ﬁ  rst hour of emergency department assessment. Our 
data suggest that in the initial 6 hours alone, HCWs manag-
ing suspected API case-patients would require ≈20–25 PPE 
sets (mean quantities: 19.4 N95 masks, 22.1 gowns, and 
25.1 pairs of gloves). Although a high proportion of HCW 
close contacts (mean 92%) wore an N95 mask appropriate-
ly for all exposures, appropriate concomitant use of other 
PPE items was less (mean 59% of exposures). Even with 
the widespread availability of PPE, this observed inad-
equate utilization rate meant that from 8% to 41% of HCW 
close contacts were likely to require postexposure antiviral 
prophylaxis if current WHO recommendations were fol-
lowed (9). If appropriate PPE, especially N95 masks, were 
not available, the number of HCWs who would experience 
moderate-risk API exposure requiring postexposure antivi-
ral prophylaxis would increase substantially.
Notably, a substantial minority of close contacts (15%; 
≈2 per API patient) were non-HCWs (e.g., hospital patients 
or visitors), generated primarily in the triage area. Although 
the duration of unprotected exposure was often short (<5 
minutes) for these persons, they represent a potential risk 
for subsequent community and hospital spread of API. This 
highlights the importance, in triage and reception areas par-
ticularly, of using appropriate infection control measures 
and signage to assist in cohorting of potential API patients 
and minimizing exposure of unprotected bystanders.
The critical importance of effective PPE in hospital 
infection control was demonstrated during the outbreak of 
SARS in 2003 (10–14). Nosocomial transmission of SARS 
was a prominent feature of the epidemic (15) and played a 
large role in the initiation and maintenance of outbreaks. 
As reported in a case-control study by Seto et al. (13), staff 
who used masks (in particular), gowns, and performed 
hand hygiene were less likely to become SARS infected 
than those who did not. Similarly, Lau et al. (14) noted that 
inconsistent use of PPE by HCWs working on wards with 
SARS patients in Hong Kong was associated with a sig-
niﬁ  cantly higher risk for nosocomial disease transmission. 
Provision of adequate PPE stock is therefore likely to be 
important in controlling the spread of API.
Many countries are compiling extensive stockpiles of 
PPE and antiviral medications for use if a new pandemic 
occurs. Planning for sufﬁ  cient numbers of resource items 
is complex and dependent on estimations of pandemic-
related additional emergency presentations, hospitaliza-
tions, general practice, and outpatient visits. In Austra-
lia, ofﬁ  cial estimates of additional hospitalizations range 
from 57,900 to 148,000 (4). Our data suggest that man-
agement of this number of hospitalizations without re-
gard for suspected inﬂ  uenza patients who are assessed but 
who are not sufﬁ  ciently ill to require admission, would 
require from 1,123,260 to 3,714,800 PPE sets (depending 
on whether they were N95 masks, gowns, or gloves, or 
all 3 items). Although ascertaining (from these data) the 
number of courses of postexposure antiviral prophylaxis 
required is difﬁ  cult, if stocks of readily available PPE 
were inadequate, the number of courses of antiviral medi-
cation required would likely increase dramatically, up to 
12–13 courses per suspected API case during the initial 
6-hour assessment. Thus, adequate stocks of PPE provide 
a means of protecting valuable antiviral drug stockpiles 
for use in ill or heavily exposed persons.
An important consideration when extrapolating our 
data to other healthcare systems is that recommendations 
regarding the optimal form of respiratory protection vary 
between countries. The WHO interim guidelines for man-
agement of human cases of avian inﬂ  uenza  (AI) state, 
“HCWs working with AI-infected patients should select 
the highest level of respiratory protection available, prefer-
ably a particulate respirator… designed to protect the wear-
er from respiratory aerosols expelled by others” (7). This 
recommendation is reﬂ  ected in the Australian pandemic 
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Table 4. Actual and total opportunities for PPE item use by HCWs during the study period* 
Actual PPE use (total opportunities for PPE item use) by hospital† 
PPE item type  A B C D E F G H‡ I‡ Mean§
Compliance,¶
%
N95 masks 20
(22)
11
(16)
18
(18)
20
(22)
16
(17)
23
(23)
18
(18)
6
(8)
8
(11)
18
(19.4)
93
Gowns   18
(29)
11
(18)
17
(21)
19
(24)
15
(17)
20
(25)
20
(21)
6
(11)
9
(12)
17.1
(22.1)
77
Gloves 27
(35)
12
(20)
18
(21)
21
(27)
19
(21)
23
(25)
26
(27)
8
(11)
10
(13)
20.9
(25.1)
83
Eye protection   4
(20)
4
(13)
14
(16)
18
(21)
14
(16)
21
(22)
17
(17)
3
(7)
4
(7)
13.1
(17.9)
73
Shoe
protection#
–42–9–––1 2 . 1
H a t s # –1 1 3 – 1 4 –––54
*PPE, personal protective equipment; HCWs, healthcare workers 
†See Table 1 for definitions. 
‡Incomplete data as hospitals H and I terminated simulation after 2.5 h. 
§Excludes data from hospitals H and I. 
¶Actual/total opportunities for PPE item use. 
#Use of shoe protection and hats not proscribed by the World Health Organization for routine use; data recorded only if these items were used. RESEARCH
inﬂ  uenza guidelines (3) and explains the high use of N95 
masks in our study. However, pandemic inﬂ  uenza plans in 
the United Kingdom (5), United States (6), and Canada (16) 
currently recommend the use of surgical masks for close 
patient care, unless the HCW is engaged in procedures in 
which aerosolization occurs. Thus the proportion of N95 
masks to surgical masks required will vary between coun-
tries with different guidelines, which affects assessment of 
stockpile adequacy. Our study did not assess the relative 
efﬁ  cacy of N95 masks compared with surgical masks for 
protection against API transmission.
This study has several limitations. First, the duration of 
the study was short (6 hours), much shorter than the likely 
in-hospital stay of days for a patient with severe inﬂ  uenza. 
Thus, total PPE and antiviral agent usage per admission 
is likely to be substantially higher. Second, the study was 
conducted at a less busy time of day for emergency de-
partments and therefore may not reﬂ  ect the greater number 
of persons who would likely be exposed in the triage and 
emergency department areas during busier periods. Third, 
the patient was not clinically unwell or hypoxic; thus, rela-
tively few HCWs were required to assess, manage, or re-
view the API patient’s condition. Fourth, we observed the 
management of the index API case-patient alone, although 
we acknowledge that actual patients are likely to come to 
the hospital with other household members (high-risk close 
contacts). However, extending observation to include man-
agement of asymptomatic but potentially infectious ac-
companying persons in a standardized manner would have 
substantially increased the complexity of the exercise. Our 
ﬁ  ndings, therefore, likely underestimate the true resources 
required and contacts exposed for the management of a 
genuine API patient. Finally, the presence of observers and 
the preceding education sessions may have artiﬁ  cially in-
creased compliance with PPE use, although in the event of 
a true pandemic one might assume that HCW compliance 
rates would be high as they aim to minimize their personal 
risk. Also, this study was designed to quantify the use of 
PPE in an environment with raised awareness of infection 
control practice, mimicking that which might occur dur-
ing a pandemic, and thus provide relevant data for health 
resource planners.
This study suggests that managing a single API patient 
is resource intensive and exposes a high number of persons 
to a potentially severe infection. These data represent the 
likely minimum clinical resources required during an API 
patient’s initial hospital assessment using current WHO-
derived infection control guidelines. Given our ﬁ  ndings, if 
a global inﬂ  uenza pandemic occurs with attack rates even 
on the lower end of projected estimates, demand for PPE 
and antiviral medication in healthcare facilities will likely 
outstrip current supply in industrialized countries, let alone 
the supply in resource-poor settings. Further studies are 
needed to assess resource usage in other healthcare settings 
such as intensive care units, fever clinics, general practice, 
and the community.
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